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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States spends nearly twice as much per capita on medical care
as any other country.1 The United States has the world’s most advanced
biomedical technologies, sophisticated hospitals, and skilled health
professionals.2 The United States has a national public health body, the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), that is generally considered the
world’s leader in infectious disease detection and response.3 Nonetheless, the
United States suffered among the world’s worst COVID-19 disease burdens and
outcomes, inflicting largely avoidable harm on patients, health professionals,
and the broader community.4
Why this happened is clearly important. But that it happened is itself
significant. Criticisms of the U.S. health care system abound, but often have a
Lake Wobegon character: The “health care system” may be bad, but my
personal doctor is good.5 A silver lining of the pandemic experience is the
 James R. Dougherty Chair for Faculty Excellence, School of Law, and Professor of

Surgery and Perioperative Care, Dell Medical School, The University of Texas at Austin.
1 Nisha Kurani & Cynthia Cox, What Drives Health Spending in the U.S. Compared
to Other Countries, HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.healthsystem
tracker.org/brief/what-drives-health-spending-in-the-u-s-compared-to-other-countries/ [https://
perma.cc/UY74-HJWA].
2 NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., U.S. HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE: SHORTER LIVES, POORER HEALTH 106 (Steven H. Woolf & Laudan Aron eds.,
2013).
3 CDC’s Global Health Partnerships, CDC (May 9, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov
/globalhealth/partnerships.htm [https://perma.cc/WQ7P-EZRA].
4 See Mortality Analyses, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. & MED.: CORONAVIRUS RSCH. CTR.,
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality [https://perma.cc/L7V4-ZM4U].
5 Alison Kodjak, Many Dislike Health Care System but Are Pleased with Their Own
Care, NPR (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/02/29/468244777
/many-dislike-health-care-system-but-are-pleased-with-their-own-care [https://perma.cc/AJP5527V].
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possibility that Americans will finally recognize that, whether or not one’s own
doctor is in fact good, American health care is unreliable, wasteful, and unjust.
Should this occur, the path forward should combine several issues of law and
policy to which I have devoted much of my scholarly career. These include
improving corporate governance, rethinking professional ethics and selfregulation, remaking health care delivery, and broadening competition policy—
with the common objective of enhancing collective goals and obligations in U.S.
health policy.

II. THE MISSING “MACRO”
The article in this volume by Professors Barak D. Richman and Steven L.
Schwarcz on Macromedical Regulation tells an essential part of this story.6
Making useful analogies to the 2008 financial crisis that tipped the American
economy into prolonged recession, they assert the importance of crafting
systematic protections for interdependent health care organizations that mirror
stabilizers that exist for the U.S. private banking system, rather than continuing
to focus on assuring the quality and accessibility of individual facilities.7 I
applaud their approach and overwhelmingly agree with their analysis and
recommendations.
Unlike regulation of the financial system and its corporate components,
however, expecting private actors to perform public duties is not a novel insight
in health care.8 Our entire “system” has been premised on it, and we back it with
taxpayer support. In a typical year, the United States spends roughly as much
public money per capita on medical care as any other country, to which we add
an equal amount of private spending.9
6 See generally Barak D. Richman & Steven L. Schwarcz, Macromedical Regulation,

82 OHIO ST. L.J. 727 (2021).
7 Id. at 728–29.
8 The financial regulatory literature also now routinely considers the public
responsibilities of the corporate private sector. For an example that shortly precedes the Great
Recession, see generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley,
105 MICH. L. REV. 1817 (2007) (highlighting the social expectations implicit in the
regulatory and self-regulatory approaches taken by Congress in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
9 For specific comparisons among Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development countries based on 2010 data, see DAVID SQUIRES, THE COMMONWEALTH
FUND, MULTINATIONAL COMPARISONS OF HEALTH SYSTEMS DATA, 2012, at 3–5 (Nov. 2012),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/___media_files_publicat
ions_in_the_literature_2012_nov_pdf_2012_oecd_chartpack.pdf. [https://perma.cc/CGH4CGC6]. Whether the United States is at the top in per capita public funding of health care,
or just near the top, has varied in recent years. See, e.g., ROOSA TIKKANEN, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND, MULTINATIONAL COMPARISONS OF HEALTH SYSTEMS DATA, 2019,
at 3 (Jan. 2020), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/Tikkanen
_multinational_comparisons_hlt_sys_data_2019_01-30-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4G4SDMT]; ROOSA TIKKANEN, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, MULTINATIONAL COMPARISONS OF
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Government has empowered self-regulating health professions, supported
the construction and operation of non-profit hospitals, funded the science that
allows the private sector to patent lucrative biomedical technologies, subsidized
health professions education and training, and financed health insurance
coverage for all of the preceding elements while protecting “free choice” by
multiple parties at multiple levels, including insurance, medical care provider,
and treatment.10
The essence of the U.S. health care system is not based on any ideological
distinction between profit-making companies and public agencies. It is that the
United States has allowed and encouraged public duties in health care to be
defined almost entirely by a casual extrapolation to the population level of the
ethical obligations of individual physicians to individual patients.11
For this reason, the focus by Richman and Schwarcz on using
“macromedical regulation” to boost pandemic preparedness seems too modest.
Although future pandemic threats are inevitable, the most important lessons for
U.S. health policy from COVID-19 are almost certainly not about infectious
disease. The most important lessons are about how the conceptualization of our
health care system, expressed in part through its regulation and funding, limits
its performance. As Richman and Schwarcz acknowledge, the market is already
collectivizing some risks and therefore coordinating some responses: previously
independent hospitals have consolidated into health systems, and independent
physician-owned practices are being absorbed through employment
relationships into large hospitals and national physician specialty groups.12
Because physician-patient dyads still dominate how we think of health care,
however, the system is simultaneously too consolidated (which raises prices and
discourages innovation) and too fragmented (which increases vulnerability to
inefficiency and injustice).
Collectivism is equally stunted by the framing of health reform, even
ofttimes by progressives. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA), for example, ultimately presented a truncated version of universal
HEALTH SYSTEMS DATA, 2018, at 4 (Dec. 2018), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites
/default/files/2018-12/Multinational%20Comparisons%20of%20Health%20Systems%20Data%
202018_RTikkanen_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQP6-3WNE].
10 See ROBERT I. FIELD, MOTHER OF INVENTION: HOW THE GOVERNMENT CREATED
FREE-MARKET HEALTH CARE 24–25 (2014) (discussing the crucial role of public initiatives
in private health care); Charles D. Weller, “Free Choice” as a Restraint of Trade in
American Health Care Delivery and Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1351, 1356 (1984) (quoting
AM. MED. ASS’N, ORGANIZED PAYMENTS FOR MEDICAL SERVICES 142 (1939)) (noting the
potential for market power from unconstrained choice of physician).
11 See generally William M. Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and the
Widening Gap Between Individual Health Law and Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J.
497 (2008).
12 E.g., CAROL K. KANE, AM. MED. ASS’N, POLICY RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES: UPDATED
DATA ON PHYSICIAN PRACTICE ARRANGEMENTS 6 (2019), https://www.ama-assn.org
/system/files/2019-07/prp-fewer-owners-benchmark-survey-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZD45XZD].
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coverage that offered consumerism without solidarity.13 This was stated clearly,
if perhaps accidentally, in President Obama’s Rose Garden remarks after the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the ACA’s favor in June 201514:
And unlike Social Security or Medicare, a lot of Americans still don’t know
what Obamacare is beyond all the political noise in Washington. Across the
country, there remain people who are directly benefitting from the law but
don’t even know it. And that’s okay. There’s no card that says “Obamacare”
when you enroll. But that’s by design, for this has never been a government
takeover of health care, despite cries to the contrary. This reform remains what
it’s always been: a set of fairer rules and tougher protections that have made
health care in America more affordable, more attainable, and more about you—
the consumer, the American people.15

To the Obama administration, pragmatic health reform was an exercise in
assuring the accessibility and affordability of individually selected health
insurance, letting each American family choose or keep a physician and a health
plan.16 No national identity was at stake; no shared responsibility was
demanded.17 As I have written previously, there was no “Americare.”18
The “macromedical” implications of COVID-19 are about adding principle
to pragmatism and about defining in a principled fashion the collective
investment and performance that the American public must demand of its health
care system. In a Harvard Law School blog post offering advice to the Biden
administration, I suggested the following:
From risk of harm to prevention of spread to ICU access to vaccination, the
COVID-19 pandemic shows us that one cannot defend the ethics of the
individual without defining the ethics of the group. Making the country
healthier and less vulnerable to future threats is a communitarian project, linked

13 Solidarity, a central, celebrated aspect of health policy outside of the United States,

is rarely cited in domestic reform proposals. See Alceste Santuari & William Sage,
Paradigms of Healthcare Systems, Law, and Regulation: A Transatlantic Conversation, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE HEALTH LAW 19, 56–57 (David Orentlicher &
Tamara K. Hervey eds., 2021); William M. Sage, Solidarity: Unfashionable, but Still
American, in CONNECTING AMERICAN VALUES WITH AMERICAN HEALTH CARE REFORM 10,
10–11 (Mary Crowley ed., 2009), https://www.thehastingscenter.org/wp-content
/uploads/Connecting_American_Values.pdf [https://perma.cc/T93L-M8WG]; see also José
Miola, Putting the Morals Back into Medicine – Emphasizing the ‘We’ over the ‘Me,’ 82
OHIO ST. L.J. 815, 818–19 (2021).
14 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
15 Remarks by the President on the Supreme Court’s Ruling of the Affordable Care Act,
1 PUB. PAPERS 743, 744 (June 25, 2015).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 William M. Sage, Why the Affordable Care Act Needs a Better Name: “Americare,”
29 HEALTH AFFS. 1496, 1496–97 (2010).
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inextricably to recognizing and redressing the injustices that impose risks on
and withhold benefits from the poor and marginalized.19

In my view, moreover, the nation having empowered physicians to oversee
its health care system in an ethical fashion, the medical profession must
explicitly give the nation ethical permission to change it.
Admittedly, shifting the health care system in a consciously collective
direction asks a lot of both the general public and the medical profession.
Especially in our troubling and troubled times, with political discord, economic
dislocation, and the looming threat of climate change. But it may prove
beneficial to acknowledge and confront this challenge now, before trillions of
additional dollars are misspent and millions of additional Americans suffer
unjust health consequences.

III. EXPECTATIONS VERSUS THE SYSTEM WE HAVE
Public expectations of the U.S. pandemic response are straightforward to
list. Detection and mitigation of COVID-19 spread should have been timely,
with assets pre-positioned, supply chains verified, personnel trained and ready
for deployment, and lines of communication tested.20 It should have been
effective, avoiding infection, morbidity, and mortality. It should have been
efficient, with coordination among relevant actors and with planning updated as
the pandemic evolved and knowledge grew. It should have been accessible, with
testing, treatment, and prevention available widely without financial barriers or
discrimination based on race, socioeconomic status, or geography. And it should
have been transparent, with clear, honest messaging about known facts,
statistical risks, and uncertainties.
It is no accident that these expectations mirror the attributes that the
National Academy of Medicine has identified as essential to a high-performing
health care system—that it be safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient,
and equitable.21 Unfortunately, in its comprehensive 2000 report on quality of
care, the Academy (then Institute) of Medicine had buried the U.S. system rather
than praise it, concluding that not one of the six criteria had been fully
achieved.22
19 William M. Sage, Be a Transformational President, Mr. Biden: Launch a

Commission to Create an Ethical Health Care System, HARV. L. SCH. PETRIE-FLOM CTR.:
BILL OF HEALTH (May 4, 2021), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2021/05/04/bidencommission-ethical-health-care/ [https://perma.cc/C6UE-XWPF].
20 See Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 729–30.
21 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., THE FUTURE OF NURSING 2020–2030:
CHARTING A PATH TO ACHIEVE HEALTH EQUITY 275–76 (Mary K. Wakefield, David R.
Williams, Suzanne Le Menestrel & Jennifer L. Flaubert eds., 2021), https://www.nap.edu
/catalog/25982/the-future-of-nursing-2020-2030-charting-a-path-to (on file with the Ohio
State Law Journal).
22 INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 23–25 (Rona Briere ed., 2001).
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A health care system that does not function particularly well under its
accustomed conditions is not likely to excel when subjected to once-in-acentury stress in a public health emergency. Money would need to be better
spent, with authority clearer and less parochial, and with frequent titration to
achieve desired results. The delivery of individual health care would need to be
integrated with population-level surveillance and intervention both within and
across geographic areas. The health care workforce would need greater
diversity, teamwork, and resilience. And shared principles of solidarity and
equity would need to tie everything together for both health care providers and
the public.
The beating heart of the U.S. health care system is its dependence on lavish
revenues, which drives its information collection, its chains of authority, its
organization, and its specialty and geographic distribution.23 Cost control and
objective performance are secondary goals.24 Accordingly, the policy response
to the pandemic tried to make the best of a bad system, such as by using federal
recovery money to repay hospitals for lost income from shifts in patient demand
and associated payer mix.25 However, federal policy fell short of extreme cash
infusions that, while wasteful, might have offset the delay and dissonance that
beset the health care system in the early weeks of the pandemic. These might
have included pre-negotiated, instantly triggerable billing codes for
consultation, testing, and treatment in the event of a pandemic emergency, plus
an increase under such circumstances of Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursements to match private insurance benchmarks. The actual federal
response also made counterproductive concessions to existing but dysfunctional
power structures, such as overemphasizing the ability of prominent academic
health systems and other private hospitals to obtain supplies, deliver care, and
protect communities, which invited fraud and abuse from untested suppliers and
discriminated against poorer communities of color.26
The tendency in the United States to “medicalize” public health
preparedness, place it under decentralized physician control, and cast public
cooperation in terms of individual doctor-patient relationships is longstanding.27
When the 1986 Chernobyl reactor failure threatened a regional if not global
health disaster from nuclear accidents, the most visible U.S. commentator was
a physician, Robert Gale, who urged greater investment in bone marrow

23 See COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: HEALTH
SPENDING AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET 1 (May 2018).
24 See id. at 2.
25 CARES Act Provider Relief Fund, HHS, https://www.hhs.gov/coronavirus/cares-actprovider-relief-fund/index.html [https://perma.cc/YL5F-82U3].
26 See Leonard E. Egede & Rebekah J. Walker, Structural Racism, Social Risk Factors,
and Covid-19—A Dangerous Convergence for Black Americans, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Sept.
7, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp2023616?articleTools=true [https://
perma.cc/H557-7VKC].
27 See Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 729–30.
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transplantation programs to treat radiation-induced cancers.28 When fears of the
Ebola virus were spreading across the United States in 2014 because of media
sensationalism and political posturing, the public was urged by government to
“see your doctor” for symptoms suggesting infection.29 Had any significant
number of Ebola cases reached the United States, this was advice likely to yield
avoidable chaos, as few physicians have expertise in containing extremely
deadly, highly contagious pathogens and even fewer physician offices are
equipped to receive and isolate such patients safely.30

IV. POLICY LESSONS LEARNED
While COVID-19 is not yet behind us, and the pandemic policy playbook
therefore is not yet fully revised, the first pandemic year offered several lessons
for policy development in health and health care. As noted above, the analysis
by Richman and Schwarcz is consistent with most of these points, although they
downplay the need to substitute direct government provision of health-related
services for similar private activities.31
First, financing most health care organizations mainly through elective
surgical procedures and specialty care paid by private insurance is foolish. It
leaves smaller providers and their employees vulnerable to business shutdowns
or diversions for public safety or to preserve scarce supplies and puts even larger
providers in financial jeopardy if payer mix shifts quickly.32 As Richman and
Schwarcz observe, a national health crisis is a time when private health care
providers require stability and coordination and when skilled personnel deserve
financial security and psychosocial support.33 Memorably, the physician
executive leading one of New York City’s major academic hospitals complained
28 See Anne C. Roark, Chernobyl ‘Hero’: Dr. Gale—Medical Maverick, L.A. TIMES

(May 5, 1988), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1988-05-05-mn-3615-story.html
[https://perma.cc/LZ7A-FN93].
29 See Tara Kirk Sell et al., Media Messages and Perception of Risk for Ebola Virus
Infection, United States, 23 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES J. 108, 108 (2017).
30 See Here’s the Johns Hopkins Study President Trump Referenced in His Coronavirus
News Conference, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. (Feb. 27, 2020), https://hub.jhu.edu/2020/02/27
/trump-johns-hopkins-study-pandemic-coronaviruscovid-19-649-em0-art1-dtd-health/ [https://
perma.cc/4AGB-VYGM].
31 See Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 772.
32 “Payer mix” refers to the balance of privately insured, Medicare, Medicaid, and
uninsured patients treated by a hospital or medical practice. David A. Frenz, What’s Your
Payer Mix?, TODAY’S HOSPITALIST (Mar. 2020), https://www.todayshospitalist.com/insurerpayer-mix/ [https://perma.cc/DX7P-BHYL]. Private insurers typically “reimburse” (pay)
providers considerably more than Medicare would, and Medicaid reimbursement is even
lower. See id. COVID-19 shifted payer mix away from private reimbursement in the short
term and probably in the long term as well. GLENN MELNICK & SUSAN MAERKI, CAL.
HEALTH CARE FOUND., THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON CALIFORNIA HOSPITALS
11 (June 2020), https://www.chcf.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/FinancialImpactCOVID19
CAHospitals.pdf [https://perma.cc/L82J-JCVH].
33 See Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 730–32.
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in spring 2020 that the pandemic was flooding his facility with Medicare and
Medicaid patients, even though it was entirely predictable that the old and the
poor would be, as they usually are, at greatest risk from any novel health
threat.34 Dependence on private reimbursement for elective services also
perpetuates one of the core failings of the U.S. system, which is that
management of billings and revenue typically receives greater attention from
health care providers than management of costs and operations.35
Second, expecting private health care organizations to perform public health
functions is unrealistic even if it is more politically (fiscally) acceptable because
it avoids explicit taxation and direct public employment.36 Under “normal”
conditions, competition among increasingly consolidated hospitals and
physicians emphasizes non-price dimensions and defers to professional
standards, in large part because private insurers tend to act as network
administrators and claims processors for self-funded employers and government
programs rather than buying for their own account in active marketplaces.37 The
COVID-19 pandemic showed that “competing” private hospitals often spent
more for scarce resources in a time of emergency while getting less for their
money, and they proved challenging to audit and monitor when they did receive
public funds.38 Explicitly governmental importation, production, inventory, and
distribution mechanisms—such as the Strategic National Stockpile and the
Defense Production Act—turned out to require better planning and investment,
plus greater political will to assert collective interests.39 Profound failures in
ramping up COVID-19 testing, lack of community engagement in many areas
sufficient to overcome political bias or manipulation, and gaps in public
education that continue to prevent vaccine uptake also demonstrated that an
effective public health response likely requires a larger, more empowered,
proved trustworthy public workforce—including public health nurses, social
workers, community health workers, and key civic leaders.
34 See generally Sarah Kliff, Hospitals Knew How to Make Money. Then Coronavirus
Happened., N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/us/hospitalsrevenue-coronavirus.html/ [https://perma.cc/CD5F-93Z3].
35 See Sean Nicholson & David A. Asch, Hospitals Need Cash. Health Insurers Have
It., HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 25, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/03/hospitals-need-cash-healthinsurers-have-it [https://perma.cc/8WHR-BCWY].
36 Whether costs of social programs appear explicitly as taxes and spending on
government budgets has acquired critical political and practice importance in recent decades.
For an overview with respect to health reform, see generally William M. Sage & Timothy
M. Westmoreland, Following the Money: The ACA’s Fiscal-Political Economy and Lessons
for Future Health Care Reform, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 434, 434–35 (2020) (discussing
budgetary policy in healthcare reform).
37 See Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 765–66.
38 Clary Estes, States Are Being Forced into Bidding Wars to Get Medical Equipment
to Combat Coronavirus, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/claryestes
/2020/03/28/states-have-are-being-forced-into-bidding-wars-to-get-medical-equipment-tocombat-coronavirus/?sh=48b9d0221cde [https://perma.cc/JZS5-6JBR].
39 See id.
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Third, many health care laws and regulations are outdated, are too protective
of physicians’ professional privilege, and should not be reinstated after the
pandemic emergency ends.40 These include state professional licensing
provisions and other restrictions on non-physician (advanced practice nurse,
pharmacist, registered nurse) practice that reduce access to geographically
accessible, high quality, cost-effective care.41 Similarly at risk of post-pandemic
restoration are insurance coverage and payment laws that disadvantage nonphysician services or care provided virtually through telehealth,
teleconsultation, and remote patient monitoring.42 Many of these laws were
relaxed or amended on an emergency basis because of stay-at-home orders,
moratoria on in-person delivery of elective medical services, and the need to redeploy trained personnel rapidly across geographies as COVID-19 infections
waxed and waned.43 But the political power of the medical profession is deeply
entrenched, and the desire among cash-strapped health care organizations with
large labor forces to resume traditional operations is strong.44 Backsliding in
both practice norms and governing laws is therefore a serious risk that
perpetuates existing inefficiencies and inequities as well as increasing
vulnerability to future threats.
Fourth, neglecting “long-term care” costs lives.45 The dominance of acute
care in U.S. health spending renders skilled nursing, post-acute, and congregate
care settings nearly invisible to policymakers and the public despite an aging
population, rising chronic disease burdens, and worrisome trends in dementia
and progressive cognitive decline.46 Rapid spread of COVID-19 infection
between staff and residents, with significant resident mortality, exposed the
reality that long-term care is underfunded, understaffed, and poorly regulated.47
Medical and policy research on this experience shows the perils of high staff
40 See generally William M. Sage, Fracking Health Care: How to Safely De-Medicalize

America and Recover Trapped Value for Its People, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 635 (2017)
(explaining the need for legal reform).
41 See, e.g., Donnie L. Bell & Mitchell H. Katz, Modernize Medical Licensing, and
Credentialing, Too—Lessons from the COVID-19 Pandemic, 181 JAMA INTERNAL MED.
312, 312–14 (2021); NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 21, at 363–64.
42 See Reed Abelson, Is Telemedicine Here to Stay?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/03/health/covid-telemedicine-congress.html [https://
perma.cc/53SR-H4UU].
43 See Bell & Katz, supra note 41, at 312–13.
44 See, e.g., Lyle Muller, Pandemic Spikes in Rural States, Where Small Hospitals Are
Already in Financial Distress, REVEAL NEWS (Oct. 16, 2020), https://revealnews.org/article
/pandemic-spikes-in-rural-states-where-small-hospitals-are-already-in-financial-distress/ [https://
perma.cc/8GSQ-UL5J].
45 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS, ENG’G, & MED., REDUCING THE IMPACT OF DEMENTIA IN
AMERICA: A DECADAL SURVEY OF THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 24, 180–81
(2021), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/26175/reducing-the-impact-of-dementia-in-america-adecadal-survey (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
46 Id. at 7–8, 153–54, 180–81, 187–88.
47 Id. at 24.
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turnover in larger facilities, as well as the challenges of requiring COVID-19
vaccination among those caring for vulnerable seniors and the disabled.48 It is
critical that this work receive prominence in pandemic-related media coverage
and help inform policy change.
Fifth, “Health Justice” needs to be at the core of future U.S. health reform,
a fact made clearer by the coincidence of attention to both health and race in
2020.49 Throughout the pandemic, America’s “haves” did far better than its
“have-nots,” including BIPOC populations, poor rural areas, and immigrant
communities.50 This applied equally to the health care providers that serve
“have-not” communities;51 in New York City, for example, public hospitals and
their patients suffered much greater privation and much worse consequences
than was the case for prestigious private facilities.52 Among other things, the
pandemic exposed the structural racism that had long been embedded in
supposedly objective, science-driven prioritization of patients according to
potential clinical benefit.53 Chronic conditions and disabilities often reflect
social failures, not personal choices;54 communities with high rates of COVIDinduced respiratory failure as the result of multi-generational discrimination
therefore should not be denied lifesaving services under “crisis standards of
48 Matt Richtel & Reed Abelson, Nursing Homes Confront New Covid Outbreaks amid

Calls for Staff Vaccination Mandates, NY. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com
/2021/08/04/health/nursing-homes-vaccine-delta-covid.html [https://perma.cc/Y63H-JZFP].
49 See Jessica L. Roberts, The Health Justice Potential of Macromedical Regulation, 82
OHIO ST. L.J. 845, 849–52 (2021); see also Wendy Netter Epstein, The Healthcare System
Misnomer, 82 OHIO ST. L.J. 779, 783–85 (2021) (arguing that targeting preventative
healthcare interventions towards disadvantaged populations is one of the best ways to impact
health outcomes). See generally ELIZABETH TOBIN-TYLER & JOEL B. TEITELBAUM,
ESSENTIALS OF HEALTH JUSTICE: A PRIMER (2019) (describing Health Justice); DAYNA
BOWEN MATTHEW, JUST MEDICINE: A CURE FOR RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN HEALTH
CARE (2015) (discussing the impact of health care inequalities on people of color); Lindsay
F. Wiley, From Patient Rights to Health Justice: Securing the Public’s Interest in Affordable,
High-Quality Health Care, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 833 (2016) (proposing a health justice
model as a replacement to the current patient rights model for exploring healthcare quality
and access).
50 See Don Bambino Geno Tai, Aditya Shah, Chyke A. Doubeni, Irene G. Sia & Mark
L. Wieland, The Disproportionate Impact of COVID-19 on Racial and Ethnic Minorities in
the United States, 72 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 705, 705 (2021).
51 See Muller, supra note 44.
52 Brian M. Rosenthal, Joseph Goldstein, Sharon Otterman & Sheri Fink, Why
Surviving the Virus Might Come Down to Which Hospital Admits You, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/nyregion/Coronavirus-hospitals.html [https://
perma.cc/4KTG-C2TT].
53 See Ibram X. Kendi, Stop Blaming Black People for Dying of the Coronavirus,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/race-andblame/609946/ [https://perma.cc/J7XM-VHJA].
54 See RACHEL REBOUCHÉ & SCOTT BURRIS, The Social Determinants of Health, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 1097, 1097–98 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K.
Hoffman & William M. Sage eds., 2017).
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care” or other systems of prognosis-based rationing.55 The pandemic experience
has also reminded policymakers that the laws that matter most to health are
usually not those one thinks of as “health law,” but rather the laws that help
provide economic security, education, jobs, and housing; that improve policing
and criminal justice; and that protect basic civil rights from racism and
disenfranchisement.

V. CONCLUSION: FROM ETHICS TO ACTION
Richman and Schwarcz frame “macromedical regulation” as a coordinated
alternative to regulating single hospitals and individual physicians that could
anticipate and counter systematic risks to the nation’s health such as another
viral pandemic.56 But the problem runs deeper than that. It is not merely that the
United States regulates health care primarily at the individual level; it is that the
United States conceptualizes the nation’s health as the product of millions of
interactions between physicians and their patients. From mask resistance to
vaccine hesitancy, the American experience with COVID-19 shows that tension
between individual choice and the collective interest is an endemic problem in
U.S. public policy, which the dyadic, physician-dominated approach to health
policy accentuates.
I would therefore expand and restate the goals of “macromedical
regulation.” It is not particularly about dealing better with another pandemic,
and it is only indirectly about preventing one. It is mainly about valuing
collective health and well-being and about investing wisely in it—including by
addressing social problems that bear on health without medicalizing them.57
That is only partially a regulatory project. It is also a managerial project, one
that may be harder to accomplish if pandemic-induced financial stresses on
health care organizations relegate corporate visionaries to the background while
pragmatists clean house and make payroll. And it is a civics project, requiring
good faith engagement by those holding different views despite partisan
acrimony.58
55 See Egede & Walker, supra note 26; INST. OF MED., CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE: A

TOOLKIT FOR INDICATORS AND TRIGGERS 11 (Dan Hanfling, John L. Hick & Clare Stroud
eds., 2013), https://doi.org/10.17226/18338 (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
56 Richman & Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 776.
57 See generally ELIZABETH H. BRADLEY & LAUREN A. TAYLOR, THE AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE PARADOX: WHY SPENDING MORE IS GETTING US LESS (2013) (discussing
relative lack of social investment in the United States); RICHARD (BUZ) COOPER, POVERTY
AND THE MYTHS OF HEALTH CARE REFORM (2016) (arguing that poverty, not clinical
uncertainty, explains geographic variation in health care spending); Raj Chetty et al., The
Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 2001–2014, 315
JAMA 1750 (2016) (examining the geography and socioeconomics of longevity).
58 The defense of democracy requires an even more challenging but necessary exercise
in civics education. See EDUCATING FOR AM. DEMOCRACY, EXCELLENCE IN HISTORY AND
CIVICS FOR ALL LEARNERS 8 (Mar. 2021), https://www.educatingforamericandemocracy.org
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Most of all, I would argue, it is a project for the health professions.
Physicians can make significant progress in reorienting U.S. health care toward
collective goals, but only if their professional ethics acknowledges its
importance. For that reason, I would urge the creation of a new Presidential
Commission on Medical Ethics.59 Its charge would include to explain how
unethical the current system has become in its wastefulness and injustice; to
support social investment in health, even when that favors non-medical over
medical approaches; to recognize and reverse the biases that perpetuate racism
and other forms of discrimination in the exercise of professional judgment; and
to advocate for benefits to communities and populations as strongly as for the
well-being of individual patients, including by confronting problems such as
climate change and mass incarceration that fall outside the usual “lanes” of
medical advocacy.60 One might call this “macromedical ethics.”

/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Educating-for-American-Democracy-Report-Excellence-inHistory-and-Civics-for-All-Learners.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XLW-CBJ2].
59 For information on previous commissions, see U.S. Bioethics Commissions,
BIOETHICS RSCH. LIBR., https://bioethics.georgetown.edu/library-materials/digital-collections
/us-bioethics-commissions/ [https://perma.cc/458C-QPJZ].
60 For a similar view of physicians’ ethical obligations in today’s world, see Donald M.
Berwick, The Moral Determinants of Health, 324 JAMA 225, 225–26 (2020).

